California's Suppression Statute -An
Examination of Penal Code § 1538.5

TERRY J. KNOEPP*

If a statute is drafted with clarity and has limited objectives, it is
easy to analyze its application and to measure its effectiveness.
But where a single statute has as its objective the radical restructuring of pretrial criminal procedure, an understanding of its
impact and proper application becomes as difficult as it is necessary.
On November 7, 1967, the most far-reaching innovation in California criminal procedure became law. Senate Bill 88,1 drafted in
the Los Angeles District Attorney's Office, became California Penal
Code § 1538.5 2-the statutory motion to suppress evidence.
Its proponents were confident, its reception mixed, its subsequent
history checkered. No other jurisdiction has anything quite like it.
The statute certainly has not been ignored; it has been estimated
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that at least one-third of all felony cases utilize Penal Code § 1538.5,
and castigation of crowded court calendars begins with criticism
of suppression hearings.3 Major restructuring of the criminal process has been necessitated. In San Diego County, for example, one
day each week the criminal court system is devoted almost exclusively to suppression hearings. Jammed calendars have occasionally been the cause of misapplications of Penal Code § 1538.5 which
frustrate its purpose, and prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
judges have found reasons to both damn and praise it.
Yet in the five years since it was enacted, Penal Code § 1538.5
has never been subjected to an overall reevaluation. 4 Its provisions, together with subsequent judicial interpretations, have never
been systematically analyzed. Its success in the light of the Legislature's original objectives has never been appraised.
This article 'discusses the practical application of Penal Code
§ 1538.5, including scope of coverage, procedure at the hearing, and
appellate review; finally, there is an assessment of the statute's
success and some suggested changes.
I.
BACKGROUND

Penal Code § 1538.5 was enacted following hearings and studies
during 1965-1967 by the Assembly Interim Committee on Criminal
Procedure. The end result of these studies was a series of recommendations, a substantial portion of which became law.5 § 1538.5
provides a comprehensive scheme for challenging the introduction
into evidence, and for the return of items unlawfully seized. It
sets forth the proper time for such motions, the procedure for appellate review and for extraordinary writs, and other significant
matters all relating to unlawful searches and seizures.
Until 1955 and the adoption of the Exclusionary Rule in People
v. Cahan,6 the occasional challenges to admissibility were consist3. Kushner & Nisselson, Problems in the Management of Courts in
California, Report to Assembly Comm. on the Judiciary. Supp. to App.
to Journal of the Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1969) 12. See Holmes, Incorrigible
Cahan at Age Fifteen-A Proposal for Civilizing Him, 45 L.A. BAR BULL.
518, 520-22 (1969).
4. For a useful description of § 1538.5, see Woodworth, Outline of Procedure Upon Motion to Suppress, 45 CAL. ST. B.J. 218 (1970).
5. 22 Cal. Assembly Interim Comm. Report No. 12 (1965-1967) [hereinafter cited as Assem. Corn. Rep.].
6. 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955); Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence
Obtained by Illegal Searches-a Comment on People v. Cahan, 43 CAL.
L. REv.565 (1955).
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ently denied.7 After Cahan the procedure for challenge developed
along the lines already familiar in federal courts.8 This procedure,
as it became crystallized, is fully described in People v. Gershenhorn,9 wherein a defendant had the following opportunities to chal-

lenge evidence:

(1) a non-statutory pretrial motion to suppress;'10

(2) if made and overruled at the preliminary examination, a review
by a motion under Penal Code § 995;" (3) if unsuccessful, an extraordinary writ of prohibition; (4) if unsuccessful, renewal of the
motion at trial; (5) if overruled, raising of the point on appeal
from a judgment of conviction. 12
The Assembly Committee noted several glaring weaknesses in
this procedure. "One of the major defects in the present law is
that it permits, if not encourages, search and seizure issues to be
raised during the trial of a criminal case."' 3 This broke the continuity of the proceedings and caused the loss of much jury time.
Furthermore, Los Angeles District Attorney Evelle J. Younger testified that fully one-eighth of the time spent by his office was
taken up by motions to suppress evidence. Last, but not least, it
was felt that for reasons of fairness the prosecution should not be
precluded from pretrial appellate review.
The committee report recommended that a study be undertaken

to determine the feasibility of establishing pretrial procedure concerning the admissibility of evidence in criminal cases. The result
was Penal Code § 1538.5.14
7. People v. Kelley, 22 Cal. 2d 169, 137 P.2d 1 (1943); People v. Gonzalez, 20 Cal. 2d 165, 124 P.2d 44 (1942); People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237,
205 P. 435 (1922); People v. LefDoux, 155 Cal. 535, 102 P. 517 (1909); People v. Alden, 113 Cal. 264, 267, 45 P. 327, 328 (1896) ('"Whether or not
the record was removed . . . may, perhaps be a question of some consequence to the person who removed it, but is of no consequence in the
case at bar; its competency as evidence in the San Francisco court in no
way depended upon the means by which it was brought there.").
8. FED. R. Camn. P. 41 (e); Note, Methods of Challenging Searches and
Seizures in California,54 CAL. L. Rzv. 1070 (1966).
9. 225 Cal. App. 2d 122, 37 Cal. Rptr. 176 (1964).
10. Saidi-Tabatabai v. Superior Court, 253 Cal. App. 2d 257, 61 CaL
Rptr. 510 (1967).
11. CAL. P--. CODE § 995 (West 1972).
12. Saidi-Tabatabai v. Superior Court, 253 Cal. App. 2d 257, 61 Cal.
Rptr. 510 (1967).
13. Assem. Comm. Rep., supra note 5, at 18.
14. See App. C, infra at 245.

The salient features of the statute are: (1) its status as an exclusive remedy for illegal search and seizure; 15 (2) its limitations
on the right to bring the motion; 16 (3) its provision for pretrial appellate review by both defendant and prosecution;1 7 (4) its complex
procedural rules. Strangely, the provisions which have stimulated
the greatest controversy seem to be the least complex.
II.
SCOPE
The statute's first paragraph has proved to be a more fruitful
source of discord than the other fourteen together. The California
Legislature, in circumscribing the reach of the motion, defined its
scope in explicit and unambiguous terms. Nevertheless, various
arguments are heard for a "broad" or "narrow" application. Not
so oddly, only a few key alterations have been wrought by judicial
interpretation and gaps in the statute have been filled in neatly by
the courts in keeping with the spirit of the legislature's stated in-

tent.
Paragraph (a) begins: "A defendant may move for the return of
property or to suppress as evidence any tangible or intangible
thing obtained as the result of a search or seizure ...
."
The first
area for contention concerns the grounds upon which challenges
may be made.
The cases have been emphatic in holding that § 1538.5 is a remedy
for fourth amendment violations only.' 8 Paragraph (a) continues:
...on either of the following grounds: (1) The search or seizure
without a warrant was unreasonable. (2) The search or seizure
with a warrant was unreasonable because (i) the warrant is insufficient on its face; (ii) the property or evidence obtained is not that

described in the warrant; (iii) there was not probable cause for
the issuance of the warrant; (iv) the method of execution of the

warrant violated federal or state constitutional standards; (v) there
was any other violation of federal or state constitutional standards.
The challenged seizure must be one which has been made by
government officers or their agents; absent such governmental involvement, there are no fourth amendment standards for a search
15. CAL. PEN. CoDB § 1538.5(h), (i), (n) (West 1972).
16. Id. § 1538.5(i), (j), (o).
17. Id. § 1538.5 (a).

18. People v. Warburton, 7 Cal. App. 3d 815, 86 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1022 (1971); People v. Nebiolini, 2 Cal. App. 3d 872,
83 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1969); People v. Morrow, 276 Cal. App. 2d 700, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 201 (1969).
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and seizure by private citizens, and accordingly, Penal Code §
1538.5 has no applicability. 19
The fact that a state statute has applied fourth amendment principles to the conduct of private individuals does not alter this general rule. For example, in the leading case of People v. Superior
Court [Smith] ,20 Smith, the real party in interest, had requested a

private detective to place recording equipment in the offices of the
company of which he was an officer. The recording devices inadvertently recorded conversations between Smith and other persons
who were later summoned before a grand jury investigating possible bribery. There was no evidence that police officers were involved in the taping of the conversations. The tapes were used to
refresh the recollection of the witnesses called before the grand
jury. At a § 1538.5 suppression hearing, the trial court suppressed
the testimony of witnesses whose memories had been refreshed by
the tape recordings on the theory that the recordings contained
confidential communicatons within the meaning of Penal Code
§ 653(j).21 The California Supreme Court granted a peremptory
writ, commanding the superior court to set aside its order. The
supreme court held that Smith was not entitled to invoke Penal
Code § 1538.5 because the "seizure" of the conversations was not
made by a governmental officer or agent.
The leading case confirming the restriction of § 1538.5 to fourth
amendment challenges is People v. Superior Court [Redd] 22 decided
in 1969. The trial court had suppressed statements in a § 1538.5
hearing where the statements were challenged only on the ground
that a proper Miranda admonition had not been given. In reversing, the court of appeal pointed out that the illegality complained
of was a fifth amendment violation and "It is sufficient for present
purposes to hold, as we do, that Penal Code section 1538.5 as enacted is limited solely to questions involving searches and seizures
and is inapplicable to the resolution of issues arising from challenged confessions or admissions, except those that constitute the
fruit of a search and seizure.

' 23

19. People v. Superior Court [Smith], 70 Cal. 2d 123, 129, 449 P.2d 230,

234, 74 Cal. Rptr. 294, 298 (1969).

20. 70 Cal. 2d 123, 449 P.2d 230, 74 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1969).
21. CAL. PE. CODE § 653(j) (West 1972).
22. 275 Cal. App. 2d 49, 79 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1969).
23. Id. at 52, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 706.

The apparent clarity of the rule is deceiving. In spite of the categorical exclusion in § 1538.5 (a) and the leading interpretation of
Redd, the fifth amendment issues can be argued at a § 1538.5 hearing under two different sets of circumstances. First, an alleged
fifth amendment violation may be argued where it is the product
of prior alleged fourth amendment illegality. For example, where
a confession follows an unlawful arrest, and the defendant asserts
that the confession was involuntary because of his
unlawful arrest,
24
he may urge both issues at a suppression hearing.
Conversely, where a prior fifth amendment violation is alleged,
of which a subsequent fourth amendment violation is the fruit, determination of the fifth amendment issue is necessary to resolve
the fourth amendment issue. The leading case demonstrating the
latter situation is People v. Superior Court [Mahie],25 in which police officers, arriving at the scene of a stabbing, obtained statements
from the defendant without a Miranda admonition. The statements led to the seizure of the knife used in the stabbing. The defendant brought a motion to suppress, arguing that the seizure of
the knife was the product of his admissions obtained in violation
of his fifth amendment rights. Thus, there was a prior fifth amendment illegality and a subsequent dependent fourth amendment issue. The court accepted the defendant's reasoning and held that
§ 1538.5 was the proper forum to test the validity of the seizure
of the knife and the validity of the admission. In fact, the court
held that there was a fifth amendment violation but that no fourth
amendment violation had occurred.
The court did not find it necessary to adopt an obvious alternative rationale, which, although not disclosed in the opinion, was
certainly open to it: that defendant's detention was based on his
statements and that seizure of the knife was a fruit of that illegal
detention. This contention would have established a prior fourth
amendment illegality. Since the court did not require this rationale, it is clear that the presence of a dependent fourth amendment
issue is sufficient to permit litigation of all other related issues
at a § 1538.5 hearing.
Mahie was followed in Clifton v. Superior Court2 c and is apparently the law. The holding in Mahle has a seldom recognized implication. If the defendant's case involves an alleged fifth amendment violation, e.g., an inadequate Miranda admonition, and also
24. People v. Johnson, 70 Cal. 2d 541, 450 P.2d 865, 75 Cal. Rptr. 401,
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 969 (1969).
25. 3 Cal. App. 3d 476, 83 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1970).
26. 7 Cal. App. 3d 245, 86 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1970).
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evidence which is a product of that violation, then if defendant
wishes to suppress the evidence he must bring a § 1538.5 motion and

litigate both the fifth and fourth amendment issues. If he fails to
do so he waives his right to challenge the derivative evidence and
is precluded from bringing the motion at trial by § 1538.5 (h). This,
of course, gives the prosecution the right to join issue on both
27
grounds and to appeal an adverse ruling.

In the former circumstance, where the prior illegality is premised
on fourth amendment grounds, another significant problem arises
and its resolution also bears directly on the proper forum for determination of the admissibility of the challenged evidence. The
problem has centered around two situations, both involving intangible evidence: one, where a confession is obtained during an
illegal detention; the other, where a confession follows confrontation of the defendant with illegally seized evidence.
In the leading case of People v. Johnson,2 the California Supreme Court proclaimed that separate tests were to be used in
these two situations: "voluntariness" in the former, "causation"
in the latter. The court's holding illustrates the proper application of both tests. The defendant had been confronted with his
codefendant's confession during a burglary investigation. The codefendant, in turn, had been induced to confess by being shown
the burglary loot-a television set-which the court declared to
have been seized in violation of the fourth amendment. Rejecting
a "voluntariness" criterion, the court held that the unbroken chain
of causation tainted both confessions rendering them inadmis29
sible.
In its application of the "causation" test, the court followed the
distinction made in Rogers v. Superior Court"O between evidence
seized in violation of search and seizure provisions and voluntary
statements made during an illegal detention: "The voluntary admission is not a necessary product of the illegal detention; the evidence obtained by an illegal search or by a coerced confession is the
necessary product of the search or of the coercion." 31 Other cases,
27.

CAL. PEN. CODE

§§ 1238(7), 1538.5 (o)(West 1972).

28. 70 Cal. 2d 541, 450 P.2d 865, 75 Cal. Rptr. 401, cert. denied, 395 U.S.
969 (1969).
29. Id. at 553, 450 P.2d at 873, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
30. 46 Cal. 2d 3, 291 P.2d 929 (1955).

31. Id. at 10, 291 P.2d at 933 (emphasis added).

"voluntariness"
in accord with Johnson, stand for the use of3 the
2
test where a confession follows an illegal arrest.

The Johnson test, however, has not been uniformly applied. Although the "voluntariness" test was followed in People v. Dominguez33 in 1971, the opposite approach had been taken in the
case of People v. Hatcher34 in 1969. Hatcher involved the admissibility of a confession elicited during the course of an unlawful arrest. With knowledge of the Johnson case, the Hatcher court nevertheless traced the causal chain from the arrest to the confession,
found it unbroken, and held for the defendant.3 5
As can be seen, the Johnson case dealt with legal principles only;
since it predated §1538.5,36 the court did not discuss the numerous
practical problems which arise when § 1538.5 is used to challenge
the admissibility of statements. When entertaining a § 1538.5
motion, a court is confronted with a basic question: what is its
function? Should the court determine only the effect of the alleged
unlawful detention or arrest, or should the court look to all factors
affecting voluntariness? If the latter approach is adopted, is the
defendant precluded from raising the voluntariness issue at trial
after the § 1538.5 hearing? Perhaps most important, the suppression
court is confronted with the conflict in the differing burdens of
proof involved in the determination of a confession on voluntariness
grounds as opposed to admissibility challenged solely on fourth
amendment grounds.
Because of the problems involved, one writer has urged that
both tests should be used when determining the admissibility of
a statement made during the course of an unlawful detention or
arrest; the causation test to be used to determine the admissibility
of the confession during the course of a § 1538.5 hearing, and there-

after, the defendant to be allowed to relitigate the issue of admisbearing upon the voluntariness of
sibility at trial where all factors
37
the confession can be litigated.
The difficulty with this approach is that it frustrates the intended objective of § 1538.5, i.e., to streamline the resolution of
fourth amendment related issues.38 As noted in Clifton v. Superior
32. People v. Martin, 240 Cal. App. 2d 653, 657, 49 Cal. Rptr. 888, 891
(1966).
33. 21 Cal. App. 3d 881, 99 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
34. 2 Cal. App. 3d 71, 82 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1969).

35. Id. at 77, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
36. 70 Cal. 2d at 544, 450 P.2d at 868, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
37. Leedy, Suppression of Statements of a Defendant in Criminal Cases,
San Diego Daily Transcript, June 26, 1972, at 1, col. 4.
38. Assem. Comm. Rep., supra note 5.
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Court 9 and People v. Superior Court [Mahie],40 § 1538.5 has been
used to determine fifth amendment issues where a confession or
admission results in the subsequent seizure of evidence. Thus,
the concept of using a § 1538.5 hearing to resolve fifth amendment
issues is not unique, but the troublesome question which remains
relates to the differing burdens of proof.
It has been held that a confession or admission is not admissible
in evidence until its voluntariness is established beyond a reasonable doubt,4 1 whereas the burden'42of proof at a § 1538.5 hearing is
"preponderance of the evidence.
However, it should be noted
that the United States Supreme Court, in its most recent term, decided that the admissibility of a confession challenged on fifth
amendment grounds can constitutionally be determined by a preponderance of the evidence.43 Thus the validity of the "reasonable
doubt" standard as applied to admissibility of confessions in California is seriously in question.
The California Supreme Court has recently recognized that not
only can statements be suppressed pursuant to § 1538.5, but also
the testimony of prospective witnesses at trial can be suppressed
where the police have discovered the identity of such witnesses as
the direct result of a fourth amendment violation. 44 Closely connected to the concept of suppression of a witness is suppression of
a witness's observations. In Kirby v. Superior Court,45 a police officer, without probable cause, opened the doors to a van truck and
observed sexual conduct in violation of Penal Code § 288(a) .

6

The

court of appeal held that the observations of the officer should be
suppressed and that § 1538.5 was the proper vehicle for suppression.
With regard to allegedly obscene material, § 1538.5 provides a
constitutionally permissible vehicle to test the validity of the seiz39. 7 Cal. App. 3d 245, 86 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1970).
40. 3 Cal. App. 3d 476, 83 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1970).
41. People v. Chavarria, 276 Cal. App. 2d 66, 80 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1969);

People v. Stroud, 273 Cal. App. 2d 670, 78 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1969).

42. People v. Superior Court [,Bowman], 18 Cal. App. 3d 316, 95 Cal.

Rptr.
43.
44.
Rptr.

757 (1971).
Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
Lockridge v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 166, 474 P.2d 683, 89 Cal.
731 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 910 (1971).

45. 8 Cal. App. 3d 591, 87 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1970).
46. CAL. PEN. CODE § 288 (a) (West 1972).

ure of such material. 47 While federal authorities are in considerable conflict, California cases are uniform in holding that there is
no constitutional requirement for a pre-warrant adversary hearing; a § 1538.5 hearing to determine the lawfulness of the seizure
of obscene material is sufficiently speedy to meet due process requirements. 48 California cases also hold that there is no constitutional necessity for an ex parte judicial viewing of allegedly ob-

scene material prior to the issuance of a search warrant."9
§ 1538.5(n) provides:
Nothing contained in this section shall prohibit a person from
making a motion, otherwise permitted by law, to return property,

brought on the ground that the property obtained is protected by
the free speech and press provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions....
While the import of this subdivision has not been analyzed in case
law, it seems more probable that this language was intended by
the drafters of Penal Code § 1538.5 to preserve the constitutionality
of the section in the event that future case law would determine
that § 1538.5 was not a sufficiently speedy remedy for the determination of the obscenity issue, rather than as a grant of authority to
litigate the lawfulness of seized obscene materials.
Evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant can be suppressed

at a § 1538.5 hearing. 50 While there is clear statutory authority for
the proposition that a search warrant can be attacked for defects
appearing on its face, there has been considerable confusion as to
whether a defendant could controvert the truthfulness of allegations contained in the affidavit.5 ' The conflict was resolved for
47. People v. Sarnblad, 26 Cal. App. 2d 801, 103 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1972);
Monica Theater v. Municipal Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 1, 8 Cal. Rptr. 71
(1970); People v. de Renzy, 275 Cal. App. 2d 380, 79 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1969).
48. People v. Samblad, 26 Cal. App. 2d 801, 103 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1972);
Monica Theater v. Municipal Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 1, 8 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1970).
For an excellent discussion of both the state and federal law concerning the
seizure of allegedly obscene materials, see Hirsch & Ryan, I Know It When
I Seize It; Selected Problems in Obscenity, 4 LOYOLA L. REv. 9 (1971).
49. Monica Theater v. Municipal Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 1, 8 Cal. Rptr. 71
(1970); People v. de Renzy, 275 Cal. App. 2d 380, 79 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1969).
50. CAL. Pmx. CoDE § 1538.5 (a) (2) (West 1972).

51. Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 532 (1964); People v.
Christian, 27 Cal. App. 3d 554, 103 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1972); Monica Theater

v. Municipal Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 1, 8 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1970); cf. People v,
Buchanan, 26 Cal. App. 3d 274, 103 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1972); Kipperman, Inaccurate Search Warrant Affidavits as a Ground for Suppressing Evidence,
84 H'Rv. L. REV. 825 (1970); Mascolo, Impeaching the Credibility of Affidavits for Search Warrants: Piercing the Presumption of Validity, 44
CONN. B.J. 9 (1970); Note, Testing the Factual Basis for a Search Warrant,67 COLUm. L. Rav. 1529 (1967); Note, Defendant's Right to Controvert
a Warrant Valid on its Face, 34 FoiDwHAm L. Rnv. 740 (1966).

Penal Code § 1538.5

[VOL. 10: 209, 1973]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

California in the recent case of Theodor v. Superior Court,52 in
which the California Supreme Court held that a defendant can
traverse a search warrant in either the municipal court or the superior court under the aegis of Penal Code § 1538.5.
The supreme court noted at the outset that misstatements contained in an affidavit generally fall into three categories: reasonable errors made in good faith, negligent mistakes, and intentional
falsehoods. The court held that a defendant may challenge the
factual veracity of an affidavit only if (1) there is a factual misstatement, and (2) the affiant was unreasonable in believing the information. Moreover, the court was careful to point out that the
presence in the affidavit of inaccurate allegations resulting from
unreasonable activity does not automatically vitiate the warrant.
It requires only that such information be deleted and the warrant's
validity be tested by the accurate information remaining.
We do not hold that the presence in an affidavit of inaccurate facts
caused by unreasonable police activity automatically vitiates the
warrant. We require only that such information be deleted and the
warrant's validity be tested by the remaining accurate information.
The warrant will not be quashed if that remaining information is

sufficient, 5under
settled standards, to constitute probable cause for
3
the search.

HI.
PROCEDURE AT HEARING

Felony
A defendant in a felony case has the opportunity to bring at
least two motions to suppress. The first motion to suppress may
be made in a municipal or justice court at the preliminary hearing,5 4 and a second hearing may be had in the superior court.55
As a matter of practice, a suppression hearing in the municipal
court is usually conducted simultaneously with the preliminary
hearing. The magistrate rules upon the motion to suppress at the
52. 8 Cal. 3d 77, 501 P.2d 234, 104 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1972).

53. Id. at 101 n.14, 501 P.2d at 251 n.14, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 243 n.14. The

Theodor opinion, handed down September 28, 1972, was modified November 16, 1972, and it is the modified opinion which appears in the reporter.

The original opinion, unmodified, is found in the advance sheets at 8 Cal.
3d 77. The modified opinion is found in the advance sheets at 8 Cal. 3d
348a.
54. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1538.5 (f) (West 1972).
55. Id. § 1538.5(i).

conclusion of evidence presented on that issue and on the issue of
probable cause for commitment. Occasionally, however, it is preferable to conduct the suppression hearing immediately preceding
the preliminary hearing in order to conserve court time. The decision as to the precise time that the suppression issue should
be heard depends upon the complexity of the case. In cases where
the predominant issue is the seizure of evidence and the remaining
issues involve relatively little extra testimony, court time is economized by conducting the suppression hearing simultaneously with
the preliminary examination. However, where there are numerous
issues which can be reached only after a determination of the search
and seizure issue, then most courts prefer to hear the suppression
issue prior to the preliminary examination, on the theory that a
finding of illegality as to the seizure may obviate the need to take
testimony on the remaining issues.
If the motion to suppress is granted in the municipal court and
the defendant is not held to answer, the People may file a new complaint or seek an indictment, and the ruling in the prior hearing
is not binding in any subsequent proceedings.50 If, however, the
§ 1538.5 motion is granted in whole or in part at the preliminary
hearing, but the defendant is held to answer, the People must,
within ten days after the preliminary hearing, request a special
hearing in the superior court. If this is not done, the ruling of the
magistrate is binding at all future stages including any hearings in
57
the superior court.
Where evidence is seized pursuant to a search warrant, there are
two occasions in the municipal court where the defendant might
wish to bring his suppression motion. The defendant may wish to
challenge the sufficiency of the search warrant before the magistrate who issued it,5 8 or he may wish to challenge the search warrant at the preliminary hearing. 9 He cannot have both hearings;
the general rule is that a defendant is entitled to one and only one
suppression hearing in the municipal court either before the issuing
magistrate or at the preliminary hearing. If the seizure is challenged before the issuing magistrate, that magistrate's finding is
binding upon the magistrate hearing the preliminary examination.0 0 The defendant can, of course, bring a de novo statutory
56. Id. § 1538.5(j).

57. Id.
58. Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 77, 501 P.2d 234, 104 Cal. Rptr.
226 (1972); CAL. PEN. CoDE § 1538.5 (b) (West 1972).
59. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1538.5 (f) (West 1972).

60. People v. Sanchez, 24 Cal. App. 3d 664, 101 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1972).
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motion to suppress in the superior court.1'
Special Hearing In The Superior Court
A defendant has the right to initiate or renew a § 1538.5 motion
in the superior court after having given at least ten days notice to
the People, unless the prosecution is willing to waive a portion of
this time. 2 People v. Berumen 63 upheld the ruling of the trial
court which declined to.hear a § 1538.5 motion because no ten day
notice had been given and there was no waiver by the prosecution.
A § 1538.5 hearing in the superior court is de novo on the basis
of evidence presented at that suppression hearing, even though
there may have been a prior suppression hearing in the municipal
court.0 4 There are two caveats to this general rule. First, as was
previously noted, if a statutory motion to suppress is granted in
whole or in part in the municipal court at the preliminary hearing,
but the defendant is still held to answer, the People must, within
ten days, request a special hearing in the superior court, or else
the ruling of the magistrate is binding thereafter. Second, the
function of the trial court during a statutory motion to suppress
in the superior court is to decide disputed questions of fact, but
where the facts bearing on the legality of the search are undisputed, the issue of fourth amendment legality is then a question of
1aw.Q

Numerous cases have permitted the use of the preliminary transcript as the basis for the evidentiary hearing in the superior
court.6 6 Use of the preliminary hearing transcript, however, is
subject to the same evidentiary rules as any prior recorded testimony.6' 7 Therefore, if any party objects to its use, the transcript
or any portion thereof cannot be used absent unavailability of
61. Id.; CAL. PEN. CODE § 1538.5(i) (West 1972).
62. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1538.5 (i) (West 1972).
63. 1 Cal. App. 3d 471, 81 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1969).
64. People v. Superior Court [Mahle], 3 Cal. App. 3d 476, 83 Cal. Rptr.
771 (1970); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1538.5(i) (West 1972).
65. People v. Medina, 26 Cal. App. 3d 809, 103 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1972);
People v. Superior Court [Mahle], 3 Cal. App. 3d 476, 83 Cal. Rptr. 771
(1970).
66. See, e.g., People v. Cagle, 21 Cal. App. 3d 57, 98 Cal. Rptr. 348
(1971).
67. Hewitt v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. App. 3d 923, 927-28, 85 Cal. Rptr. 493,
495 (1970).

witnesses. If the parties intend to use the preliminary hearing
transcript in the superior court, there should be a formal stipulation to that effect on the record.6 8 There is authority, however,
for the proposition that the use of the preliminary hearing transcript, without objection and even without stipulation, is not error.6 9
It is not required that the evidence sought to be suppressed be
physically present and introduced at this special hearing. A testimonial description will suffice. 70 However, a defendant must specify in his motion what items he 'desires to have suppressed, though
it is permissible to specify all items seized during a particularly described search.71 Also, in a strongly worded opinion the court in
People v. CagZe 72 emphasized the necessity for an accurate description in the record of those items sought to be suppressed.
The Cagle case is the most recent expression of the necessity for
spelling out in the record the grounds sought for suppression. A
general objection that the evidence was seized in violation of the
78
fourth amendment does not suffice.
It is now well established that a defendant cannot raise on appeal a ground for suppression when that ground was not urged at
the motion to suppress. 74 In Mesaris v. Superior Court," the court
of appeal declined to issue a writ of mandate on the grounds that
it lacked a transcript of the proceedings in the superior court, even
though the transcript of the preliminary hearing had been lodged
in the appellate court. The result of this rule is that not only the
evidence but the argument must be transcribed if the ruling is to
be reviewed by the court of appeal. (For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see The Record On Review, infra.)
Misdemeanor
Penal Code § 1538.5 applies to suppression of evidence in misdemeanor cases as well as in felony cases.7 6 The motion to suppress
must be made prior to trial in the municipal court but there is no
ten day notice requirement such as is specified for special hearings
68. People v. Cagle, 21 Cal. App. 3d 57, 60, 98 Cal. Rptr. 348, 350 (1971).
69. People v. Locke, 274 Cal. App. 2d 541, 79 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1969).
70. People v. O'Brien, 71 Cal. 2d 394, 456 P.2d 969, 79 Cal. Rptr. 313
(1969).
71. Id.
72. 21 Cal. App. 3d 57, 98 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1971).
73. Id. at 61, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 350.

74. People v. Knifong, 23 Cal. App. 3d 154, 100 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1972);
People v. Wolder, 4 Cal. App. 3d 984, 84 Cal. Rptr. 788 (1970).
75. 4 Cal. App. 3d 976, 85 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1970).
76. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1538.5 (g) (West 1972).
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in the superior court in felony cases.7 7 If the property or evidence
to be suppressed relates to a misdemeanor filed together with a
felony, the procedures provided for suppression of evidence in fel78
ony cases is to be followed.
Burden Of Proof And Burden Of Going Forward
The burden of producing evidence at a statutory motion to suppress where there is a warrantless seizure presents a unique problem. The burden of justifying an arrest, search or seizure rests
upon the prosecution, whereas in most cases the moving party in a
motion to suppress is the defendant. In People v. Carson,79 neither

the prosecution nor the defense presented any evidence either by
way of testimony or by use of the preliminary hearing transcript
at the § 1538.5 hearing. The prosecution contended that the burden of going forward with some evidence in support of the motion
was on the defendant. The trial court disagreed, and the motion
was granted. On appeal, the order of dismissal was reversed. The
court of appeal held that even with a warrantless search, the burden of going forward with evidence to establish a prima facie case
of fourth amendment illegality was on the defendant. Absent any
evidence before the court, the defendant was not entitled to have
his motion to suppress granted. As a practical matter, evidence
by way of testimony or stipulation that a particular search or seiz-

ure was made without a warrant shifts the burden of going forward to the prosecution and the -dilemma faced by the defendant
in the Carsoncase is obviated.
Where a defendant seeks to challenge a search made pursuant
to a search warrant, and the allegations in the affidavit are not
at issue, the defense has the burden of establishing a prima facie
case of illegality. s0 However, where the challenge is to the accuracy of the allegations in the affidavit, the issues are more complex.
There are two issues to resolve: (1) Does the affidavit contain
factual misstatements? (2) If so, did the affiant nevertheless act
reasonably in believing the facts to be true? 8 ' The California Su77. Id.
78. Id.

79. 4 Cal. App. 3d 782, 84 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1970).
80. Id. at 786-87, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 703.
81. Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 77, 101, 501 P.2d 234, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 226 (1972).

preme Court recently held that the defendant has the initial burden
of demonstrating the inaccuracy of the allegations in the affidavit,
the prosecution having already sustained its initial burden by virtue
of the affidavit itself. Once it is shown that the affidavit contains
inaccurate statements of fact, the burden shifts to the prosecution to
demonstrate that the affiant's belief in the truth of the erroneous
statements was nonetheless reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.8 2 However, the California Supreme Court has emphasized that the defendant does not carry the initial burden by making a bald conclusionary statement that the allegations in the
affidavit are inaccurate on the hope that some inaccuracy or falsehood may emerge.8 3
Turning from the burden of going forward to the burden of
proof, the quantum of proof at a Penal Code § 1538.5 hearing is
"preponderance of the evidence," not "beyond a reasonable doubt,"
because determination of fourth amendment issues is a "preliminary
fact."8s 4 Penal Code § 1538.5 does not change the burden of proof
from that which existed prior to the enactment of that section. 8 "
Special Problems Relating To Rulings On The Motion
The mode and manner of appellate review following the granting
or denial of a motion to suppress is discussed later under the heading "Appellate Review." However, several troublesome problems
remain regarding the effect of rulings on a motion to suppress.
Special difficulties have arisen where the superior court entertains both a motion to suppress pursuant to Penal Code § 1538.5
and a motion to set aside the information or indictment pursuant

to Penal Code §995.86
In a motion to set aside an information under § 995, the superior
court determination is limited to evidence in the transcript from
the preliminary hearing viewed in a light most favorable to the
prosecution. A § 995 motion can be granted on search and seizure
grounds only where the evidence shows as a matter of law that the
search and seizure was unlawful. All factual inferences must be
8 7
drawn in favor of the order of commitment.
82. Id. at 103, 501 P.2d at 248, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 240.
83. Id.
84. People v. Orr, 26 Cal. App. 3d 849, 103 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1972); People
v. Superior Court [Bowman], 18 Cal. App. 3d 316, 95 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1971).
85. CAL,. Pm.CoDn § 1538.5 (n) (West 1972).
86. Id. § 995.
87. People v. Superior Court [Kusano], 276 Cal. App. 2d 581, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 42 (1969).
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Where a § 995 motion and a § 1538.5 motion are heard together,
the manner in which both motions are disposed of becomes very
important. If both motions are entertained together and the superior court is disposed to suppress certain evidence, the proper
procedure is to postpone determination of the motion to set aside
the information until the People have exhausted or waived their
rights to appellate review of the suppression order.88 This procedure is necessary since the prosecution can appeal the granting of
the § 995 motion, but is precluded from seeking any appellate review of the order granting a § 1538.5 motion; an order granting a
§ 1538.5 motion is itself not subject to appeal by the prosecution.
Only when the case is dismissed pursuant to Penal Code § 1385 can
the prosecution appeal the merits of the § 1538.5 ruling.8 9
Absent a 'dismissal under § 1385, the only available remedy to review the § 1538.5 ruling is an extraordinary writ. However, if the
trial court has already dismissed the case under § 995, the remedy
of extraordinary writ is no longer possible. Consequently, several
cases recommend that if a § 1538.5 motion is granted, the court
should hold in abeyance a ruling on the motion to set aside the information. If the court does undertake to dismiss the information
contemporaneously with the granting of a motion to suppress, these
cases hold that the dismissal should take place pursuant to Penal
Code § 1385, rather than § 995. This procedure permits an orderly
review on appeal. 90 One court has gone as far as to hold that a
trial court hearing a motion to suppress and simultaneously a motion to dismiss lacks jurisdiction to proceed on the § 995 motion,
where it grants the § 1538.5 motion.9 1
A particularly troublesome practical problem arises where a motion to suppress is brought simultaneously with a § 995 motion,
and, because of a defective record, the trial court feels compelled
to grant the § 995 motion but, because of additional evidence correcting defects in the record, the court is disposed to uphold the
88. People v. Superior Court [MacLachlin], 271 Cal. App. 2d 338, 76 Cal.

Rptr. 712 (1969).

89. Id.; CAL.

PEN. CODE § 1538.5 (o) (West 1972).
90. People v. Minervini, 20 Cal. App. 3d 832, 98 Cal. Rptr. 107 (1972);
People v. Superior Court [Kusano], 276 Cal. App. 2d 581, 81 Cal. Rptr. 42
(1969).
91. People v. Superior Court [MacLachlin], 271 Cal. App. 2d 338, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 712 (1969).

search and seizure and deny the motion to suppress. For example,
assume evidence before the magistrate at the preliminary hearing
shows that evidence was seized pursuant to a valid search warrant,
but the record is silent with regard to the knock and notice requirements of Penal Code § 1531.92 Then, at the motion to suppress in superior court, the prosecution produces additional evidence establishing that the requirements of § 1531 were met during
the execution of the search warrant. Should the trial court grant
the § 995 motion because of the defective record from the preliminary hearing while the court is aware of other evidence showing
the entry to be lawful? Neither § 1538.5 nor case law has focused
directly on the problem.
Common sense would dictate that the granting of a § 995 motion
under such circumstances would be a useless, wasteful act inasmuch as the function of the § 995 motion is to prevent only un93
founded charges from going to trial.
The solution to this dilemma is for the trial court to refuse to
hear the § 995 motion. While it is true that a § 995 motion erroneously denied is reversible error, it is also true that the § 995 motion
is discretionary.9 4 While a court hearing a § 995 motion cannot
go beyond the record of evidence presented before the preliminary
hearing magistrate or the grand jury, a court can exercise its discretion in refusing to hear a § 995 motion where the court is aware
of legally competent evidence establishing probable cause to believe
the defendant has committed the crime with which he is charged. 5
In People u. Anderson 90 defendant was indicted for murder. The
only evidence connecting defendant with the crime presented to the
grand jury was statements in violation of Escobedo v. IllinoisY'
Defendant was convicted and his conviction was reversed. Prior
to his retrial, defendant moved to withdraw his not guilty plea
for the purpose of making a § 995 motion. The trial court denied
the motion to withdraw the plea, thus preventing defendant from
bringing his § 995 motion. The supreme court upheld the trial

court's action:
In this situation the trial judge was called upon to determine
whether to set aside defendant's plea, based on a motion which was
urged in relation to a second trial. If we were to hold that the
[trial] judge could not consider evidence properly admitted at the
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

CAL. PN. Cons § 1531 (West 1972).
People v. McBride, 268 Cal. App. 2d 824, 74 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1968).
People v. Sigal, 249 Cal. App. 2d 299, 57 Cal. lRptr. 541 (1967).
Id.
70 Cal. 2d 15, 447 P.2d 942, 73 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1968).
378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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first trial, we would do no more than compel the People to perform
the needless formality of obtaining a second indictment. We
therefore hold that the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to
set aside a plea prior to a second trial does not constitute an abuse
of discretion when, as here, the first trial reveals ample legally
competent evidence on which a valid re-indictment can be obtained.9 8

Reasoning by analogy, a trial court called upon to consider a
995 motion simultaneously with a § 1538.5 motion, where the record
is defective as to fourth amendment issues in the § 995 motion, but
which deficiencies are corrected with additional testimony at the

§ 1538.5 motion, is justified in exercising its discretion in refusing
to hear the § 995 motion and denying the § 1538.5 motion.
A fair amount of litigation has developed regarding the defend-

ant's right to renew a suppression motion after it has once been
denied. The general rule in misdemeanor cases is that a defendant

cannot bring a second motion to suppress.9 9 In felony cases, there
can be no second motion to suppress in the superior court either
prior to trial 0 or at the trial itself.' 0 ' However, where the suppression court has heard the motion, that court can "reconsider"
its own motion within thirty days-that is, until the original order
has become final. 10 2 Thereafter, there can be no renewal of a

§ 1538.5 motion in the superior court unless there has been an intervening change in the law or the defendant has discovered new evidence not obtainable at his first motion. 03
98. 70 Cal. 2d at 23, 447 P.2d at 946, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
99. People v. Sanchez, 24 Cal. App. 3d 664, 101 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1972).
100. People v. Superior Court [Green], 10 Cal. App. 3d 477, 89 Cal. Rptr.
223 (1970).
101. People v. Harrington, 2 Cal. 3d 991, 471 P.2d 961, 88 Cal. Rptr. 161
(1970). While suppressed evidence is inadmissible at trial, it is admissible at a parole revocation hearing, In re Martinez, 1 Cal. 3d 641, 463 P.2d
734, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1970), and at a probation revocation hearing, People
v. Hayko, 7 Cal. App. 3d 604, 86 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1970).
102. People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62,
remanded on other grounds sub noam. California v. Krivda, 93 S. Ct. 32
(1972), aff'd sub nom. People v. Krivda, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521,
P.2d - (1973); People v. Leighter, 15 Cal. App. 3d 389, 93 Cal. Rptr.
136 (1971).
103. People v. Superior Court [Edmonds], 4 Cal. 3d 605, 483 P.2d 1202,
94 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1970). As originally enacted, § 1538.5(h) provided:
"If prior to the trial of the felony or misdemeanor, opportunity for this
motion did not exist, or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for
the motion, the defendant shall have the right to make this motion during
the course of the trial in the municipal court, justice, or superior court.
Furthermore,the court in its discretion, may entertain the motion during
the course of the trial." (Emphasis added). People v. O'Brien, 71 Cal. 2d

In one unreported decision, 104 it was held that a defendant could
not bring a second motion to suppress in the superior court where
there had been a mistrial between the first and second motions.
The defendant, at his second motion to suppress, attempted to
raise additional issues, but the trial court refused to allow relitigation of any fourth amendment issue. The court of appeal affirmed
the ruling of the trial court, holding (1) that the additional issues
sought to be relitigated at the second motion to suppress were
known or could have been known at the first motion to suppress
and (2) there was no intervening change of law or change of circumstances which would permit a renewed motion.
Where a defendant in a felony case has not brought a motion to
suppress prior to trial, he can bring that motion at the time of the
trial itself, only if grounds for the motion did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds prior to trial. 105 Furthermore, the requisite ten day notice to the prosecution is still required, and a trial court's refusal to entertain a suppression motion
at trial on the ground that the prosecution has not received its
statutory ten day notice, will be upheld on appeal. 0 6
IV.
APPELLATE REVIEW
07

Misdemeanors

Where a defendant in a misdemeanor case has made his motion
to suppress in a municipal or justice court prior to trial, both the
People and the defendant have the right to appeal an adverse decision of that court to the superior court appellate department. 08
394, 456 P.2d 969, 79 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1969), held that subdivision (h), and
particularly the last sentence, did not authorize the making of a second
motion to suppress in the superior court. The supreme court contrasted
subdivision (h) with subdivision (i) which expressly grants a defendant
the right to "renew or make" the motion at a special hearing even though
he may have already so moved at his preliminary examination. By omitting the word "renew" in subdivision (h), the supreme court concluded,
the legislature intended to limit the operation of that provision to instances in which the motion is made or entertained for the first time at
trial. During the 1970 legislative term, the legislature, as if to ratify the
reasoning of the O'Brien court, moved to eliminate the ambiguity caused by
the last sentence of § 1538.5 (h) by deleting that sentence from the subdivision.
104. People v. Donnelly, 4 Crim. 5067 (4th Dist. Ct. App., Oct. 19, 1972).
105. People v. O'Brien, 71 Cal. 2d 394, 456 P.2d 969, 79 Cal. Rptr. 313
(1969).

106. People v. Berumen, 1 Cal. App. 3d 471, 81 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1970).
107. See App. B infraat 244.
108. CAL. PE. Cons § 1538.5(j) (West 1972).
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There is a significant difference in appellate procedure between
misdemeanors and felonies after denial of a motion to suppress.
In felony cases, after denial of the motion heard prior to trial, appellate review is by way of extraordinary writ; in misdemeanor
cases, the defendant whose motion is denied should appeal rather
than seek an extraordinary writ.1 0 9

Of particular importance is Penal Code § 1510,1 ° added to the
Penal Code in 1971, which provides that a defendant can appeal
an adverse ruling at a suppression hearing in a misdemeanor case
only if the initial motion to suppress was made by the defendant
in the trial court not later than forty-five days following defendant's arraignment on the complaint, unless within this time limit
the defendant was unaware of the issue or had no opportunity to
raise it. Penal Code § 1510 was the legislative answer to the problem of trial delay caused by the late setting or excessive continuances of pretrial motions.
If a motion to suppress is granted in a misdemeanor case, the
People have the right of appeal as well.'1 1 This is so even though
there is no express provision in Penal Code § 1466112 (the People's
appeal section). Any assumed conflict is resolved in favor of a Peo109. Id. § 1538.5(o), (j) (West 1972). The right of appeal from a nonfinal order as provided for in Penal Code § 1538.5(j) is virtually un-

precedented in criminal law. The choice of providing appeal rather than
extraordinary writ relief was not accidental. As is stated in Monica Theater v. Municipal Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 1, 12, 88 Cal. Rptr. 71, 78 (1970):
"No doubt the variance in review remedies is based upon the assumption
that the time schedule leading to a decision (by way of appeal) in the
appellate department of a superior court is more rapid than that in a Court
of Appeal (where mandate and prohibition provide a speedier means to a
prompt decision) and upon a desire that the review in misdemeanor cases
at the superior court level be in the appellate department of that court."
Furthermore, the Monica court theorized in footnote 12: "One forceful
reason for not doing so is that there should be an end to reviews. A defendant ordinarily should not get a fourth judicial consideration by being
able to appeal to the Court of Appeal from an adverse decision on an
extraordinary writ proceeding before a superior court judge ....

"

This

feeling that appeal, rather than review by writ, is speedier and precludes a
fourth review by appeal from the denial of an extraordinary writ in a
superior court, accurately states the intention of the drafters of Penal
Code § 1538.5 as confirmed by conversations with one of the principal
drafters, Harry Sondheim, a deputy in the Los Angeles District Attorney's
Office.
110. CAL. PEN.

CODE

111. Id. § 1538.5(j).
112. Id. § 1466.

§ 1510 (West 1972).

ple's appeal under Penal Code § 1538.5(j), inasmuch as that section
was enacted long after Penal Code § 1466.113
Felony-Review By Defendant1' 4
Under § 1538.5 (i), a felony defendant may seek pretrial appellate
review of an adverse decision on a motion to suppress by means of
extraordinary writ, on condition that the writ is filed within thirty
days after the denial of the motion at the special hearing. The
thirty day period allowed under § 1538.5(i) commences when the
hearing judge orally denies the motion, not when the denial is entered into the minutes. Observance of this thirty day period is
jurisdictional. 115
In a further restriction, Penal Code § 1510 provides that the defendant can have pretrial appellate review in a felony case only if
his motion in the superior court was brought within sixty days following his arraignment on the information or indictment, except
where the defendant was unaware of the issues or had no opportunity to raise them earlier.
A defendant may seek further review of his fourth amendment

issues upon appeal from a conviction, notwithstanding the fact that
such judgment of conviction is predicated upon a plea of guilty,
provided that at some stage of the proceedings prior to the conviction, he has moved for the return of property or suppression of the
evidence." 6
A defendant who pleads nolo contendere after the denial of a
§ 1538.5 motion also has the right of appeal. 1 7 No certificate of
probable cause is needed in either case."18
If, after the denial of a § 1538.5 motion, the defendant goes to
trial and is convicted, he can appeal the merits of the adverse ruling
made at the § 1538.5 hearing without the necessity of objecting to
the evidence on fourth amendment grounds during the course of
the trial itself.119
Does a defendant in a felony case preserve his fourth amendment
issue for appeal if such issue is raised only by a statutory motion
113. Adams v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. App. 3d 569, 87 Cal. Rptr. 667
(1970).
114. See App. A infra at 243.
115. Gomes v. Superior Court, 272 Cal. App. 2d 702, 77 Cal. Rptr. 539
(1969).
116. CA.. PEN. CODE § 1538.5 (m) (West 1972).
117. People v. Warburton, 7 Cal. App. 3d 815, 86 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1970).
118. Id.; People v. Coyle, 2 Cal. App. 3d 60, 83 Cal. Rptr. 924 (1970).
119. People v. Medina, 26 Cal. App. 3d 809, 815, 103 Cal. Rptr. 337,
341 (1972).
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to suppress before a magistrate in the municipal court? In People
v. Knifong, 120 the defendant brought a § 1538.5 motion at the time
of his preliminary examination, contending that his rights under
Penal Code § 844121 had been violated. The motion was denied.
In the superior court, the defendant brought a new motion to suppress, contending that certain money found on his person was not

admissible at trial, but the § 844 issue was not raised. The motion
was denied. On appeal from conviction, defendant sought to have
the court of appeal reexamine the § 844 issue. The court of appeal
recognized that there was some language within § 1538.5 (m) which
gave support to defendant's contention. The court concluded, however, ".

.

. we think that the Legislature did not intend that a su-

perior court judgment be open to attack on a ground not urged before the court and on which that court had no opportunity to
22

rule.",1

An interesting dilemma was resolved in Cornelius v. Superior

Court.123

During the course of his first trial, Cornelius made a

statutory motion to suppress which was denied. He was acquitted
on all counts, save one. The jury could not agree as to this count,
and a mistrial was 'declared. Following the order of mistrial, a second motion to suppress was also denied. The court of appeal noted
that the issue of appellate review following a mistrial or the granting of a new trial was a matter of first impression; § 1538.5 did not
contemplate either situation. The court then held that the second
motion to suppress was properly denied because the latter court
was passing upon the same issues that were considered by the court
at the first motion to suppress and Cornelius had shown no new
changes of circumstances or law entitling him to renew his motion.
In regard to the proper procedure for appellate review following
a mistrial or the granting of a new trial, the court of appeal recognized the dilemma where there is no appeal prior to the second
trial. The court went on to hold, by analogy to subdivision (i) of
120. 23 Cal. App. 3d 154, 100 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1972).
121. CAL. PEN. CODE § 844 (West 1972).
122. 23 Cal. App. 3d at 162, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 97. The Knifong court also
expressed the belief that perhaps a court of appeal could review a statutory

suppression ruling made in the municipal court in cases not reaching the
superior court, i.e., where the defendant has entered a plea of guilty in the
municipal court, or in cases reaching the superior court only for sentence

after a guilty plea ina municipal or justice court.

123. 25 Cal. App. 3d 581, 102 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1972).

§ 1538.5, that the proper method of review should be by petition
for extraordinary writ filed within thirty days after the order declaring a mistrial or, where a new trial is granted, within thirty
days after the order granting the new trial becomes final. The
same rule should be applicable to the situation in which a defendant appeals the granting of a new trial on the ground that the issues in such an appeal would be limited to the question of abuse

of discretion in granting the new trial.
Though it would appear from a literal reading of Penal Code
§ 1538.5 that a defendant is entitled to appellate review both by way
of extraordinary writ prior to trial and review by way of appeal
upon conviction, the general rule affords only one opportunity for
appellate review.12 4 The supreme court has made clear, however,
that the general rule applies only when the sole possible reason for
denial of the pretrial extraordinary writ was that the issues were
decided on the merits, or it affirmatively appears that the denial
was intended to be on the merits. 25 The supreme court recognized that pretrial extraordinary writs are discretionary in nature
and are often denied without a review of the merits raised in the
petition. Therefore, neither the doctrine of res judicata nor law
of the case can apply unless it is shown that the merits, in fact,
were reviewed by the appellate court considering the petition for
the extraordinary writ.
The express language in § 1538.5 notwithstanding, the proper
remedy for a defendant upon denial of a § 1538.5 motion pretrial is
by way of writ of mandate rather than a writ of prohibition.1 2
Undoubtedly, the reason for this rule is that when considering a
petition for an extraordinary writ, the court of appeal has before
it only the records and transcripts pertaining to the suppression
hearing. The appellate court is unaware of any additional evidence of the prosecution which was not considered at the hearing.
Therefore, the proper remedy is mandate directing the trial court
to set aside its suppression order, rather than prohibition preventing
27
the superior court from proceeding with the trial.
There is a significant omission in § 1538.5 in another specific
situation. When a motion to suppress is granted at the preliminary
124. People v. Medina, 6 Cal. 3d 484, 492 P.2d 686, 99
(1972).
125. Id.
126. Raymond v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. App. 3d 321, 96
(1971); Ojeda v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. App. 3d 909, 91
(1970).
127. Raymond v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. App. 3d 321, 96
(1971).

Cal. Rptr. 630
Cal. Rptr. 678
Cal. Rptr. 145
Cal. Rptr. 678
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hearing, but the defendant is still held to answer, if the prosecution
seeks a relitigation of the previously suppressed evidence it must
file a notice of intention in the superior court to have a § 1538.5
hearing within ten days. 128 There is no provision in § 1538.5 for
appellate relief for the defendant if the prosecution's motion is
granted. This void was filled by the court of appeal in Nerell v.
Superior Court:1 2 9 "While no express language is contained in

§ 1538.5, subdivision (j) of the Penal Code authorizing the defendant
to seek extraordinary relief following the granting of the People's
motion to admit evidence, the fact that the prosecution may seek
such relief if its motion is denied supports the implication that the
accused also enjoys the same remedy.' 1 30 The Nerell court held
that where the prosecution's § 1538.5 (j) motion is granted, the defendant is entitled to pretrial relief by writ of mandate.
131
Felony-Review By The People

Penal Code § 1538.5 (o) provides:
Within 30 days after a defendant's motion is granted at a special
hearing in the superior court, the people may file a petition for writ

of mandate or prohibition, seeking appellate review of the ruling
regarding the search or seizure motion. If the trial of a criminal
case is set for a date which is less than 30 days from the granting
of a defendant's motion at a special hearing in the superior court,

the people, if they have not filed such a petition and wish to preserve their right to file such a petition, shall file in the superior
court on or before the trial date or within 10 days after the special
hearing, whichever occurs last, a notice of intention to file such a
petition and shall serve a copy of the notice upon the defendant. 132
If the superior court suppresses evidence but does not dismiss
the case, the People may seek review of the order of suppression by
writ of mandate pursuant to subdivision (o) of § 1538.5. If the
court, after making an order of suppression, -dismisses the case
under Penal Code § 1385,' 33 the People may appeal from that order
under subdivision (7) of Penal Code § 1238.134
128. CAL.PEN. CODE § 1538.5(j) (West 1972).

129. 20 Cal. App. 3d 593, 97 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1971).
130. Id. at 596, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 704.
131. See App. A infra at 243.
132. CAL. PEN.CODE § 1538.5

(o)(West 1972).

133. Id. § 1385.
134. Id. § 1238; see People v. Superior Court [Kusano], 276 Cal. App. 2d
581, 81 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1969).

An often overlooked provision of § 1538.5(j) provides that if the
defendant's motion is granted at a pretrial hearing in the superior
court, the People, if they have additional evidence relating to the
motion which was not presented at the special hearing, shall have
the right to show good cause at trial why that evidence was not
presented at the special hearing and why the prior ruling at the
special hearing should not be binding. This good cause showing
at trial is an alternative to appellate review by pretrial writ.
The prosecution in People v. Superior Court [Palmeri]13r was
confronted with a novel circumstance. A motion to suppress in the
superior court was granted as to a portion of the prosecution's evidence. Several days later, the court, reconsidering its decision,
modified its order, denying the motion as to narcotics paraphernalia which had previously been suppressed. Other evidence previously suppressed was not affected by the modification. The People sought an extraordinary writ as to the evidence still suppressed.
However, the petition was filed more than thirty days after the
original order, although within thirty days of the modification.
The court of appeal held that the thirty day period for the filing
of the writ by the prosecution started from the date of the original
order and not from the date of the modification, at least where the
modification was favorable to the People.
If a defendant's motion to suppress is granted and the case is dismissed, § 1538.5(k) provides that the defendant shall be released
on his own recognizance pursuant to the provisions of Penal Code
§ 1318,136 and shall not be returned to custody unless the proceedings are resumed in the trial court. § 1538.5 (k) similarly provides
that if the defendant's motion to suppress is granted but the case
is not dismissed, and the People file a petition for writ of mandate
or prohibition, the defendant shall be released without bail. If he
is charged with a capital offense and the proof is evident and the
presumption great, then the defendant can be held without bail. If
the defendant is charged with a non-capital homicide offense, then
the defendant can be required to post bail. The latter provision
of subdivision (k) was the legislative answer to the holding in People v. Superior Court [Mahle] 1 37 wherein the defendant, on re-

trial, was charged with second degree murder. The court of appeal held that release without bail was mandatory under subdivision (k) as it then existed.
135. 269 Cal. App. 2d 71, 74 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1969).
136. CAL. PEr. CODE

§ 1318 (West 1972).

137. 3 Cal. App. 3d 476, 83 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1970).
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The Record On Review
In 1967, as part of the same legislation which created § 1538.5,
the Legislature also amended Penal Code § 1539.38 Subdivision
(a) of that section provides that all testimony must be reported by
shorthand reporter. Subdivision (b) provides that upon written
request of any party, the reporter shall transcribe his notes and
prepare copies sufficient for each party to the hearing. The county

clerk is required to deliver the original of the transcription to the
district attorney and a copy of the transcript to each defendant.
This is provided without charge to any of the parties.
An important problem arises as to the mechanics of presenting

the proper documents to an appellate court for pretrial review.
The weight of authority follows the holding of Thompson v. Superior Court 39 wherein the defendant's motion to suppress was pre-

sented orally in the superior court. The evidentiary basis was provided by the transcript of the preliminary hearing, although there
was no stipulation to that effect. Suppression was denied. The
defendant sought mandate in the appellate court. He supplied the
preliminary hearing transcript but did not submit the transcription of the oral argument made in the superior court indicating
either the specific grounds raised at the suppression hearing or a
stipulation that the preliminary hearing transcript was to serve as
the basis for the suppression hearing in the superior court. The
Thompson court held that a defendant must supply to the court of
appeal a complete transcript of the hearing in the superior court.
Having failed to do this, the writ was denied. The Thompson
court recognized that there are mechanical difficulties involved and
that it might not always be possible for the reporter to have sufficient time to prepare the necessary transcription. In such event,
the court of appeal noted that in order to preserve the record for
pretrial appellate review, the petitioner at least should have included a copy of the written notice to the reporter as required in

§

1539.140

Mesaris v. Superior Court141 emphasizes the need for a full transcription of oral arguments as well as evidence taken at the sup138. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1539 (West 1972).

139. 262 Cal. App. 2d 98, 68 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1968).
140. Id. at 104, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 474.
141. 4 Cal. App. 3d 976, 85 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1970).

pression hearing. The Mesaris court had before it, on a petition
for writ of mandate, a preliminary hearing transcript that lacked
a transcript from the suppression hearing held in the superior
court. The court of appeal noted that its function was to review
only errors preserved for appeal by specific objection and it could
not pass upon the legality of rulings made at the § 1538.5 hearing
in the superior court because there was no record of what had been
urged as error. Accordingly, the writ was denied.
The case of People v. Pranke142 presents a clear illustration of the
practical requirement, that, on review of the superior court's suppression order, the court of appeal must have the transcript of the
hearing which includes all arguments. In Pranke, -defendant urged
suppression of some of the evidence resulting from an arrest and

did not contest the seizure of other evidence obtained by consent.
The appellate court, for reasons which become apparent upon a
reading of the facts of the case, recognized that the defense attorney's lack of objection to the evidence which had been obtained by
consent was dictated by trial strategy. The appellate court therefore held that defendant was precluded from contesting this evidence. The appellate court also pointed out that specific grounds
for objection must be presented at the time of the suppression hearing in order to put the opposing party on notice to present all relevant evidence on the issues objected to.
As a practical matter, when a written notice pursuant to Penal
Code § 1539 is filed, that notice should also include a request for
the transcription not only of evidence, but also of all oral arguments in view of the practice of many reporters of transcribing
only evidence and not the argument or objections raised during
argument.
One case has declined to follow the line of authority which began with Thompson. In Amacher v. Superior Court1' 8 the court
of appeal held that a petitioner's duties were discharged by the filing of the preliminary hearing transcript. The record in the Amacher case did include minutes from the superior court suppression
hearing showing the parties' stipulation that the suppression court
could consider the evidence from the preliminary hearing as evidence for the suppression hearing in the superior court. Also there
was no transcript of oral argument at the suppression hearing.
However, the Amacher court did not find this error nor did it discuss the numerous problems related to the lack of such transcript.
142. 12 Cal. App. 3d 935, 91 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970).
143. 1 Cal. App. 3d 150, 81 Cal. Rptr. 558 (1970).
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Problems relating to the record are simplified when a defendant
seeks appellate review after conviction. A defendant's duties are
44
easily discharged by filing a designation of record on appeal.
This should include a short specific description of each document
necessary for the appeal, including the preliminary hearing transcript if that was the evidentiary basis used in the suppression
court, a transcript of the evidence and oral testimony considered
in the superior court, and the minutes and orders prepared at the
time of the superior court hearing.
Tests On Review
A court reviewing a ruling made pursuant to § 1538.5, whether
pretrial or post-conviction, must view the facts in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party. 145 The reviewing court is to use
the "substantial evidence test."'146
V.
EVALUATION

Claim and counterclaim have marked the progress of Penal Code
§ 1538.5 from the time of its introduction in the California Legislature in 1965 as Assembly Bill 1651. Advocates of the proposed legislation noted that pretrial criminal procedure as it existed prior
to 1967 produced unnecessary delay, that it operated in a manner
to discourage plea negotiations, and that the prosecution was de-

nied the opportunity of appellate review on search and seizure issues. 147 The unhappy situation in California was contrasted with
Federal Rule 41(e) which provided for pretrial disposition of search
and seizure issues in one hearing.
Advocates of the statutory suppression legislation were enthusiastic in their support. If enacted, the legislation would shorten
trials, conserve court time and redress unequal treatment accorded
to the prosecution on fourth amendment issues. 48
144. CAL.RULES or CT.,

R. 5 (a) (West 1972).

145. People v. Villafuerte, 275 Cal. App. 2d 531, 80 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1969).

146. People v. Orr, 26 Cal. App. 3d 849, 103 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1972); People v. Medina, 26 Cal. App. 3d 809, 815, 103 Cal. Rptr. 337, 341 (1972).
147. Assem. Comm. Rep. supra note 5.
148. Id.

It was thought that trial time would be reduced because it would
not be necessary to interrupt the trial and excuse the jury while
court and counsel wrestled over time-consuming fourth amendment questions. Ancillary benefits would include the conservation
of costly jury time and maintenance of trial continuity.
Overall court time would be conserved for a variety of reasons.
Case load would be reduced through more frequent dispositions
resulting from plea negotiations. Attorneys for both prosecution
and defense could better assess the value of their cases once the

uncertainty of the admissibility of evidence was resolved. Court
case backlogs would be further reduced because A.B. 1651 would
obviate the need to go to trial to preserve fourth amendment issues
for appeal. Finally, cases involving illegally seized evidence could
be dismissed without trial.
It was also claimed that A.B. 1651 would redress several inequities suffered by the prosecution. The proposed legislation provided
for prosecution appeal of adverse rulings on search and seizure issues where none existed before. This would obviously benefit the
individual cases where adverse pretrial rulings could be reversed
on appeal, but the primary motivation of the prosecuting authorities was not simply the accession to a procedural advantage.
Rather, the overriding belief was that the proposed procedure was
more likely to achieve the ends of justice. The prosecution wanted
the opportunity to develop case law on points not raised by defense-initiated appeals, and thereby bring about a more orderly
development of the law.
There is good reason to believe that this last point, prosecution
appellate review, was the foremost consideration which motivated
the drafting of A.B. 1651.149
The bill undeniably held out benefits for the defense. A defendant convicted through the use of illegally seized evidence would
not have to languish in jail pending his lengthy post-trial appeal.
Although a defendant could petition for a pretrial extraordinary
writ prior to 1967, the granting of a hearing on the writ was discretionary; under A.B. 1651 the pretrial writ would be a matter of
right.1 50
Astute defense attorneys saw A.B. 1651 as a method of circumventing the harmless error rule. On appeal, a court had often
149. Younger, ProsecutionProblems,53 A.B.A.J. 695 (1967).
150. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1538.5(i); cf. People v. Medina, 6 Cal. 3d 484,
492 P.2d 686, 99 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1972), for a subsequent contrary judicial
interpretation.
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found a seizure to be unlawful, while holding the error to be
harmless. Should illegally seized evidence be litigable prior to
trial, no harmless error rule could be applied. It was apparent to
defense attorneys that pleas to reduced charges, even outright
dismissals, would result. In addition, it is not unreasonably speculative to assume that some defense attorneys saw A.B. 1651 as a

vehicle for trial delay through the use of suppression hearing continuances and pretrial writs.

Enactment of § 1538.5 has had bittersweet features for the prosecution. Trial delay occasioned by pretrial appellate review has
been relatively infrequent, nevertheless it has caused justifiable

alarm. When petitions for hearing reach the supreme court, two
year delays from arraignment to trial are not uncommon. 151
§ 1538.5 has played to mixed reviews from members of the bench.
Judges of the Los Angeles Superior Court have been generally crit-

ical. According to witnesses testifying before the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee, § 1538.5 has required more court time devoted to criminal matters rather than less; the witnesses argued
that defense attorneys feel compelled to bring suppression motions
to avoid incompetence of counsel arguments on appeal as much as
to litigate substantial fourth amendment issues. § 1538.5 has caused

added expense and inconvenience due to the requirement that witnesses attend an additional court session. Judges from San Diego
rose to the defense of § 1538.5, claiming that trial delays and the

increase in court time have been more than offset by the time
saved as a result of the reduced number of cases going to trial.152
The defense bar was critical of § 1538.5, generally opposing the
153
prosecution's right of appeal.
There is considerable evidence that § 1538.5 can be used more
efficiently. In San Diego County, for example, the superior court
sets aside one day a week during which the four criminal departments hear suppression motions and all other pretrial matters exclusively. Rules of Court in San Diego require that a defendant
notice all pretrial matters for the same day and court. All counsel
151. Caughlin v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 461, 482 P.2d 211, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 587 (1971) (twenty-eight months).
152. Hearings on PretrialProcedure Before the Assembly Criminal Justice Comm., 1972.
153. Id.

are required to submit written points and authorities in support of
and in opposition to the motions. Finally, trial courts rarely "reconsider" motions once heard, or permit new or renewed motions
at the time of trial. The net effect of these court-enforced rules is
the reduction of trial delay and facilitation of disposition of motions.
Other counties, e.g., Los Angeles, do not require that all pretrial
motions be heard together. The general practice is that pretrial
motions, excepting § 1538.5, are heard in advance of trial. The §
1538.5 motion is generally heard on the day of trial. The justification is that witnesses are spared a separate appearance in court for
the suppression motion even though there is general agreement
that the majority of § 1538.5 motions are heard on the transcript
of evidence from the preliminary examination thus eliminating the
need for calling witnesses. Whatever the merits of this practice,
it appears not coincidental that judges in San Diego generally are
in favor of § 1538.5 while those in Los Angeles are generally critical of the section.
The San Diego County District Attorney's Office has established
a separate division of deputies to handle pretrial motions and pretrial appellate review exclusively. This concept is also employed
in the Orange County District Attorney's Office.
Both the courts and the legislature can improve pretrial procedure. Under the present two court system employed in felony
cases, some improvements in the application of § 1538.5 can be accomplished by changes in the local rules of court. These local rules
can require that all pretrial motions be held in one hearing, thus
reducing the number of court hearings prior to trial. Renewal of
§ 1538.5 motions can be reduced by a more stringent interpretation
of the law.
The California Legislature has considered legislation during its
1972 session which would greatly expand the scope of issues subject to pretrial disposition. Senate Bill 649154 would require pretrial disposition of fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment issues as
well as severance, discovery, and consolidation motions and "[a]l1
issues other than that of guilt or innocence that are known or
should reasonably be known to the parties which could be decided
at a pretrial hearing."' 55
While it is beyond the scope of this article to assess the value of
mandatory pretrial disposition as set forth in S.B. 649, it is very
154. S.B. 649 (Lagomarsino) (1972).
155. Id. at 2.
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desirable that the legislature mandate the pretrial disposition of
fifth and sixth amendment issues. As noted, courts have recognized

in varying circumstances that fifth amendment issues can, indeed
must, be determined at a § 1538.5 hearing. 156 Legislative recognition of this fact would dispel confusion by eliminating the unnecessary and artificial requirement of a dependent fourth amendment
issue. Furthermore, court calendar delays which have been attributed to § 1538.5 are undoubtedly the product in some measure of
the arbitrary manner in which constitutional issues are segregated
for resolution. Finally, coherent definition of the law resulting
from appellate review by both defense and prosecution argues persuasively for similarity of treatment for all constitutional issues.
The legislature has also been considering a unified court system
whereby the municipal court would be abolished in favor of the superior courty57 Whatever its merits in other respects, the unified
court proposal offers an excellent opportunity for efficient disposition of pretrial issues in felony cases. Under the unified court
proposal, there would need be but one evidentiary hearing for all
pretrial matters, including probable cause for commitment, and one
opportunity for pretrial appellate review of the lower court ruling.
This would replace the present system of an evidentiary hearing
on search and seizure issues in the municipal court followed by review of that ruling in a § 995 hearing and a second fourth amendment hearing in the superior court followed by a pretrial writ review.
Improvements short of major legislation, at a minimum, would
include amendment of Penal Code § 995 to remove fourth amendment issues from its scope. This would eliminate the incentive to
bring § 995 and § 1538.5 motions before different judges at different
times. If the legislature feels as strongly about crowded court calendars as do those most critical of § 1538.5, it could go as far as
removing the right of defendants to pretrial appellate review.
CONCLUSION

Critical evaluation must be preceded by definition of standards.
Unfortunately, most criticism of § 1538.5 is directed exclusively at
156. People v. Superior Court [Mahle], 3 Cal. App. 3d 476, 83 Cal. Rptr.
771 (1970).

157. A.B. 159 (Hayes) (1972).

its effect on procedural efficiency, ignoring or minimizing its more
significant features. The statute's effect on efficiency is incapable
of statistical proof because the relevant statistics do not exist. 158
Its other attributes are incapable of statistical proof because they
are not susceptible of quantification. Thus, conclusions as to its
efficiency must necessarily be grounded on opinion and therefore
must be subordinated to other more persuasive factors: (1) Prosecution appeal contributes to the orderly development of the law

and is an important addition to California's system of justice. (2)
Elimination of trial interruptions has had a positive effect on criminal trial procedure. (3) Accurate assessment of evidence against
a defendant permits his entry into plea negotiations from a more
informed base. (4) Dismissal by the prosecution of cases involving
illegally seized evidence benefits not only the defendant but the
entire judicial system.
On balance, one is led to the conclusion that Penal Code § 1538.5
is a valuable addition to the cause of criminal justice.
158. There are no statewide statistics indicating the number of §1538.5
motions which have been brought, nor are there statistics showing the disposition of §1538.5 motions.
Pleas,Dismissals, Acquittals
(Expressed as a % of total felony dispositions in California)
1971
1970
1969
1967
1968
1966
Dismissal
7.7
7.5
8.0
8.6
8.9
8.2
Plea
61.3
59.9
59.5
63.0
61.0
68.1
Acquittal
7.4
7.9
6.4
6.4
6.8
6.0
-STATE OF CALIF., DEP'T or JUSTIcE, DrviSION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, BUREAU OF CRIuVnNAL STATISTICs, FELONY DEENDANTs DisPOSED OF IN CALIFORIUA COURTS (1971).

Dismissals have increased since 1968, while, simultaneously, acquittals
have decreased. These statistics, taken together, could indicate that cases
involving unlawfully seized evidence are being dismissed prior to trial
rather than going to trial to obtain an acquittal. Pleas of guilty have
increased slightly since 1968, giving some comfort to advocates of § 1538.5
who believe that plea negotiations have been facilitated by that section.
The inferences drawn from the above statistics obviously must be considered with caution.
The presence of other phenomena might affect the statistics. For example, Penal Code § 17 (b) (5), effective in 1968, authorizes the magistrate to
accept a misdemeanor plea in the municipal court to any felony which has
a misdemeanor minimum penalty. The growing use of § 17 (b) (5) suggests

that such dispositions will have an impact on nontrial disposition statistics.
There are opposing views, however, as to the manner in which such statistics will be affected. One view holds that cases involving questionable
seizures result in compromise pleas in the municipal court. The other view
holds that a defendant with a substantial fourth amendment issue will
not accept a § 17(b) (5) disposition, preferring instead to gamble on an outright dismissal. Finally, the author is unaware of any statistics which
measure delays in trial dates occasioned by § 1538.5. See Holmes, Incorrigible Cahan at Age Fifteen-A Proposal for Civilizing Him, 45 L.A. BAR
BULL. 518, 520, 522 n.20 (1969).
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APPENDIX C
§ 1538.5. [Motion for return of property or suppression as evidence: Special hearings: New complaint or indictment: Appeals: Review by mandate or prohibition: Stay of proceedings:
Dismissal of action: Release of defendant: Bail: Motions based
on freedom of speech or press]
(a) A defendant may move for the return of property or to suppress as evidence any tangible or intangible thing obtained as a
result of a search or seizure on either of the following grounds:
(1) The search or seizure without a warrant was unreasonable.
(2) The search or seizure with a warrant was unreasonable
because
(i) the warrant is insufficient on its face; (ii) the property
or evidence obtained is not that described in the warrant;
(iii) there was not probable cause for the issuance of the warrant; (iv) the method of execution of the warrant violated
federal or state constitutional standards; or (v) there was any
other violation of federal or state constitutional standards.
(b) When consistent with the procedures set forth in this section
and subject to the provisions of Section 170 through 170.6 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, the motion should first be heard by the
magistrate who issued the search warrant if there is a warrant.
(c) Whenever a search or seizure motion is made in the municipal, justice or superior court as provided in this section, the judge
or magistrate shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary
to determine the motion.
(d) If a search or seizure motion is granted pursuant to the proceedings authorized by this section, the property or evidence shall
not be admissible against the movant at any trial or other hearing
unless further proceedings authorized by this section or Section
1238 or Section 1466 are utilized by the people.
(e) If a search or seizure motion is granted at a trial, the property shall be returned upon order of the court unless it is otherwise subject to lawful detention. If the motion is granted at a
special hearing, the property shall be returned upon order of the
court only if, after the conclusion of any further proceedings au-

thorized by this section or Section 1238 or Section 1466, the property is not subject to lawful detention or if the time for initiating
such proceedings has expired, whichever occurs last. If the motion is granted at a preliminary hearing, the property shall be returned upon order of court after 10 days unless the property is
otherwise subject to lawful detention or unless, within that time,
further proceedings authorized by this section or Section 1238 are
utilized; if they are utilized, the property shall be returned only
if, after the conclusion of such proceedings, the property is no
longer subject to lawful detention.
(f) If the property or evidence relates to a felony offense initiated by a complaint, the motion may be made in the municipal or
justice court at the preliminary hearing.
(g) If the property or evidence relates to a misdemeanor complaint, the motion shall be made in the municipal or justice court
before trial and heard prior to trial at a special hearing relating to
the validity of the search or seizure. If the property or evidence
relates to a misdemeanor filed together with a felony, the procedure provided for a felony in this section and Sections 1238 and
1539 shall be applicable.
(h) If, prior to the trial of a felony or misdemeanor, opportunity
for this motion did not exist or the defendant was not aware of
the grounds for the motion; the defendant shall have the right to

make this motion during the course of trial in the municipal, jus-

tice or superior court.

(i) If the property or evidence obtained relates to a felony offense initiated by complaint and the defendant was held to answer
at the preliminary hearing, or if the property or evidence relates
to a felony offense initiated by indictment, the defendant shall
have the right to renew or make the motion in the superior court
at a special hearing relating to the validity of the search or seizure
which shall be heard prior to trial and at least 10 days after notice
to the people unless the people are willing to waive a portion of
this time. The defendant shall have the right to litigate the validity of a search or seizure de novo on the basis of the evidence presented at a special hearing. After the special hearing is held in
the superior court, any review thereafter desired by the defendant
prior to trial shall be by means of an extraordinary writ of mandate or prohibition filed within 30 days after the denial of his motion at the special hearing.
(j) If the property or evidence relates to a felony offense initiated by complaint and the defendant's motion for the return of
the property or suppression of the evidence at the preliminary
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hearing is granted, and if the defendant is not held to answer at
the preliminary hearing, the people may file a new complaint or
seek an indictment after the preliminary hearing, and the ruling
at the prior hearing shall not be binding in any subsequent proceeding. If the property or evidence relates to a felony offense
initiated by complaint and the defendant's motion for the return
or suppression of the property or evidence at the preliminary
hearing is granted, and if the defendant is held to answer at the
preliminary hearing, the ruling at the preliminary hearing shall
be binding upon the people unless, upon notice to the defendant
and the court in which the preliminary hearing was held and upon
the filing of an information, the people within 10 days after the
preliminary hearing request in the superior court a special hearing, in which case the validity of the search or seizure shall be
relitigated de novo on the basis of the evidence presented at the
special hearing, and the defendant shall be entitled, as a matter of
right, to a continuance of the special hearing for a period of time
up to 30 days. If defendant's motion is granted at a special hearing in the superior court, the people, if they have additional evidence relating to the motion and not presented at the special hearing, shall have the right to show good cause at the trial why such
evidence was not presented at the special hearing and why the
prior ruling at the special hearing should not be binding, or the
people may seek appellate review as provided in subdivision (o),
unless the court prior to the time such review is sought has dismissed the case pursuant to Section 1385. If the property or evidence seized relates solely to a misdemeanor complaint, and the
defendant made a motion for the return of property or the suppression of evidence in the municipal court or justice court prior
to trial, both the people and defendant shall have the right to appeal any decision of that court relating to that motion to the
superior court of the county in which such inferior court is located,
in accordance with the California Rules of Court provisions governing appeals from municipal and justice courts in criminal cases.
If the people prosecute review by appeal or writ to decision, or
any review thereof, in a felony or misdemeanor case, it shall be
binding upon them.
(k) If the defendant's motion to return property or suppress evidence is granted and the case is dismissed pursuant to Section
1385, or the people appeal in a misdemeanor case pursuant to sub-

division (j), the defendant shall be released pursuant to Section

1318 if he is in custody and not returned to custody unless the
proceedings are resumed in the trial court and he is lawfully ordered by the court to be returned to custody.
If the defendant's motion to return property or suppress evidence
is granted and the people file a petition for writ of mandate or prohibition pursuant to subdivision (o) or a notice of intention to file
such a petition, the defendant shall be released pursuant to Section 1318 unless (1) he is charged with a capital offense in a case
where the proof is evident and the presumption great, or (2) he
is charged with a noncapital offense defined in Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 187) of Title 8 of Part 1 and the court orders that the defendant be discharged from actual custody upon
bail.
(1) If the defendant's motion to return property or suppress evidence is granted, the trial of a criminal case shall be stayed to a
specified date pending the termination in the appellate courts of
this state of the proceedings provided for in this section, Section
1238, or Section 1466 and, except upon stipulation of the parties,
pending the time for the initiation of such proceedings. Upon the
termination of such proceedings, the defendant shall be brought to
trial as provided by Section 1382, and subject to the provisions of
Section 1382, whenever the people have sought and been denied
appellate review pursuant to subdivision (o), the defendant shall

be entitled to have the action dismissed if he is not brought to
trial within 30 days of the date of the order which is the last denial of the petition. Nothing contained in this subdivision shall
prohibit a court, at the same time as it rules upon the search and
seizure motion, from dismissing a case pursuant to Section 1385
when such dismissal is upon the court's own motion and is based
upon an order at the special hearing granting defendant's motion
to return property or suppress evidence. In a misdemeanor case,
the defendant shall be entitled to a continuance of up to 30 days
if he intends to file a motion to return property or suppress evidence and needs this time to prepare for the special hearing on
the motion. rn case of an appeal by the defendant in a misdemeanor case from the denial of such motion, he shall be entitled
to bail as a matter of right, and, in the discretion of the trial or
appellate court, may be released on his own recognizance pursuant
to Section 1318.4.
(m) The proceedings provided for in this section; Section 995,
Section 1238, and Section 1466 shall constitute the sole and exclusive remedies prior to conviction to test the unreasonableness of a
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search or seizure where the person making the motion for the return of property or the suppression of evidence is a defendant in
a criminal case and the property or thing has been offered or will
be offered as evidence against him. A defendant may seek further review of the validity of a search or seizure on appeal from
a conviction in a criminal case notwithstanding the fact that such
judgment of conviction is predicated upon a plea of guilty. Such
review on appeal may be obtained by the defendant providing that
at some stage of the proceedings prior to conviction he has moved
for the return of property or the suppression of the evidence.
(n) Nothing contained in this section shall prohibit a person
from making a motion, otherwise permitted by law, to return
property, brought on the ground that the property obtained is protected by, the free speech and press provisions of the Federal and
State Constitutions. Nothing in this section shall be construed as
altering (i) the law of standing to raise the issue of an unreasonable search or seizure; (ii) the law relating to the status of the
person conducting the search or seizure; (iii) the law relating to
the burden of proof regarding the search or seizure; (iv) the law
relating to the reasonableness of a search or seizure regardless of
any warrant which may have been utilized; or (v) the procedure
and law relating to a motion made pursuant to Section 995 or the
procedures which may be initiated after the granting or denial of
such a motion.
(o) Within 30 days after a defendant's motion is granted at a
special hearing in the superior court, the people may file a petition
for writ of mandate or prohibition, seeking appellate review of the
ruling regarding the search or seizure motion. If the trial of a
criminal case is set for a date which is less than 30 days from the
granting of a defendant's motion at a special hearing in the superior court, people, if they have not filed such a petition and wish

to preserve their right to file such a petition, shall file in the superior court on or before the trial date or within 10 days after the
special hearing, whichever occurs last, a notice of intention to file
such a petition and shall serve a copy of the notice upon the defendant.

